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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The patent bargain has been described as a balance between the public good that 
results from full disclosure of scientific research and a private property right.1  Physical 
property rights are well-defined and as a result the economic and legal concerns 
surrounding them are well-understood.2  However, the property right at issue in the 
patent bargain is not readily fenced off to prevent trespass.3  There are only two ways to 
uphold such a property right: by “keeping it under the mattress” or by providing legal 
remedies to the owner against trespassers.4  Intellectual property law encourages both 
types of protection, but the prospect of reverse engineering provides a powerful incentive 
to enter the patent bargain.  5
¶2 An increasing body of data supports the notion that disclosure is economically 
beneficial.  These studies go beyond the anecdotal observation that cultures with strong 
intellectual property rights protections have historically excelled technologically and 
economically.6  More recent studies of growth in the developing world support 
theoretical and historical approaches to the patent bargain as a growth engine.7  Although 
dissent remains as vigorous as ever,  the idea that some balance of individual property 8
 
* Daniel Lev is a 2007 J.D. candidate at Northwestern University School of Law.  He received a Ph.D. in 
Chemistry from the University of California, San Diego in 2004 and a B.S. in Biology, Chemistry, and 
Biochemistry from Brandeis University in 1998.  He is grateful Professor Emerson Tiller for many helpful 
discussions and comments. 
1 Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 
WIS. L. REV. 81, 82 (2004). 
2 In his 2003 tome on intellectual property, Professor Landes stated: “The economics of property rights in 
physical property are now well understood, and its basic elements can be summarized fairly briefly.”  
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW 11 (2003). 
3 Id. at 12-20 (constrasting the cost-benefit differences between tangible physical property and intangible 
intellectual property). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 21-22 (discussing the high costs of protecting patent assets that are easily imitated). 
6 Economic historians have noted the grant of “open letters” (“litterae patentes” in Latin) in 15th Century 
Venice and 17th Century England, both times of rapid economic expansion in those countries.  Paul A. 
David, Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda’s Thumb: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets 
in Economic Theory and History in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE 
AND TECHNOLOGY 19, 44-48 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Mary E. Mogee & Roberta A. Schoen eds., 1993).  
Contra ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS: THE NETHERLANDS, 1869-1912; 
SWITZERLAND, 1850-1907 (1971) (presenting a historical analysis of economic expansion in countries 
without patent rights that, nonetheless, achieved a high degree of economic expansion).   
7 See SHAHID ALIKHAN & RAGHUNATH MASHELKAR, National Economic Development Strategy and 
Intellectual Property, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 55-
87 (2004). 
8 Intellectual property laws, particularly patent laws, have been the subject of intense political debate during 
many phases of economic and legal development.  See David, supra note 6, at 230-32.  See also Fritz 
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rights and public disclosure increases the benefits to society and is economically efficient 
has prevailed.  9
¶3 However, one area where the public has had relatively free reign is in conducting 
research that builds on the inventions disclosed in granted patents.  The reason for this 
right to research arises from two theories of innovation – one is analogous to the fair use 
doctrine in copyright law and one based on the ultimate value that arises from 
improvement innovations.10  These dual theories have given rise to two legal doctrines, 
each of which encompasses aspects of both theories — the common law research 
exemption and the statutory exemption.   
¶4 This comment focuses on the recent Supreme Court decision in Merck KGaA v. 
Integra Lifesciences.11  The decision primarily pertains to the exemption from patent 
infringement liability for research activities related to pharmaceutical development 
contained in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).  Justice Scalia’s unanimous opinion announced a 
textualist interpretation of the statute that overruled a narrow formalistic interpretation by 
a three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit in 2003.    12
¶5 By examining the Federal Circuit’s doctrinal development regarding both the 
common law and the statutory research exemption, it will first be shown how these 
doctrines informed the split panel decision.  Second, the Federal Circuit’s normative 
approach will be considered – particularly whether the decision was consistent with 
precedential interpretations of the research exemption.  In this section, the decision is 
analyzed in terms of legal realism and the contentious circumstances of the case.  Third, 
while the Supreme Court’s decision is strictly based on the plain language of the statute, 
the economic realities of the research exemption support this interpretation over that of 
the Federal Circuit panel majority.13  Prospectively, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences 
indicates that textualism with respect to the patent law should be adhered to whenever 
possible – restricting policy decisions to the enacted statute.  The modest conclusion is 
for the Federal Circuit to be mindful of normative tendencies, particularly when not in 
concert with textualist analysis, and recognize that economic realities often preclude such 
normative proscriptions. 
 
Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1-29 
(1950). 
9 See Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norm of Science, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 77, 136-51 (1999) (discussing the competing economic and social interests involved in 
balancing the patent bargain in the context of biomedical technology).  See also Michael A. Heller & 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 
SCIENCE 698, 700-701 (1998) (describing how the narrowing of the experimental use exemption through 
“pro-patent” doctrines is detrimental to innovation in bio-pharmaceutical technology). 
10 Strandburg, supra note 1, at 120-23. 
11 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
12 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Rader, J., writing for the 
majority) (Newman, J., dissenting-in-part). 
13 Judge Newman’s dissent contained some of the same basic features of Justice Scalia’s opinion.  Id. at 
872. 
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A. The “Fair Use” Common Law Research Exemption  14
¶6 The common law research exemption began with Whittemore v. Cutter, in which 
Justice Story now famously quipped “it could never have been the intention of the 
legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical 
experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce 
its described effects.”15  In 1813, Justice Story, sitting on the Circuit Court for the District 
of Massachusetts, recognized that two types of activities were not subject to the patent 
right to exclude: (1) innate human curiosity and (2) experiments to decipher the patented 
invention.  Defining “philosophical experiments” and “ascertaining the sufficiency of the 
machine” has been the focus of the common law research exemption doctrine ever 
since.  16
¶7 The Federal Circuit clarified its position with a decisively “pro-patent” opinion 
early in its history.   In Roche v. Bolar,17 18 the court held that pure “scientific inquiry” was 
protected by the safe harbor, but only insofar as it lacks “definite, cognizable, and not 
insubstantial commercial purposes.”19  The Roche court significantly narrowed the 
common law exemption and established a commercial purpose threshold.20 The Federal 
Circuit affirmed its narrow commercial purpose interpretation six times in the twenty 
intervening years between Roche and Integra.  21
¶8 While technically in line with the Federal Circuit’s focus on commercial purposes, 
Madey v. Duke represents a severe limitation of the experimental use doctrine, wherein 
even non-profit and educational research is infringement when a distant commercial 
purpose exists.22  The court’s ruling merely reverses summary judgment, but the decision 
lays out a legal framework wherein “the experimental use defense persists albeit in the 
very narrow form articulated” in Embrex and Roche,23  which “clearly do[] not immunize 
use that is in any way commercial in nature.”24  The court eviscerated the educational use 
defense, stating that the “business” of Duke University was educational.   This 25
 
14 See JANICE M. MUELLER, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States Patent 
Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 917, 925-37 (2004) (presenting a comparison of the fair use doctrine in copyright law to the 
development of the common law research exemption in patent law). 
15 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600). 
16 See DONALD S. CHISUM, 5 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03 (2005). 
17 See id. at § 16.03[1][b] (discussing the history of the research exemption from Whittemore until the 
founding of the Federal Circuit, in which “[r]elatively few decisions actually excused the making and use 
of patented products or processes on the basis of experimental or nonprofit purpose”).
18 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984). 
19 Id. at 863. 
20 The Federal Circuit’s decision in Roche was part of the impetus for Congress to pass the Hatch-Waxman 
Act’s statutory safe harbor for generic drug development.  See infra notes 28 and 29. 
21 See, e.g., Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the 
research exemption is not available when a commercial goal is present, no matter how attenuated); Madey 
v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 959 (2003) (discussed in text infra).  
See also Hoechst-Roussel Pharm., Inc. v. Lehman, 109 F.3d 756, 763 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (discussing Roche 
doctrine in concurrence). 
22 Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362-63. 
23 Id. at 1361. 
24 Id. at 1362 (emphasis added). 
25 The court elaborated on this point, stating, “[M]ajor research universities, such as Duke, often sanction 
and fund research projects with arguably no commercial application whatsoever.  However, these projects 
   137
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 0 6  
 
established a subjective test that looks to “the alleged infringer’s legitimate business, 
regardless of commercial implications.”26  The experimental use principle has been 
refined to the proposition that experimental, educational, or non-profit uses do not 
infringe patent rights when the damages and gains realized by these uses are de minimis27 
— a proposition that accomplishes what many view as its purpose within the patent 
bargain.  28
B. The Plain Language of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) 
¶9 In 1984, partly in response to what it perceived as problems with the Federal 
Circuit’s application of the common law research exemption,29 Congress enacted the 
statutory safe harbor for experimental uses related to the development of generic drugs.30  
The “Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,” also known as 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, enacted two major statutory revisions that together represented a 
compromise between generic drug manufacturers and large pharmaceutical companies – 
the “innovators.”31  The generic drug manufacturers were given earlier entry to the 
market by exempting the research necessary for them to submit an abbreviated new drug 
application (ANDA) from patent infringement.32  And patented pharmaceuticals that are 
the subject of a new drug application (NDA) could apply for an extension of the standard 
patent term by the amount of time required by the FDA to approve the application.  33
¶10 The Hatch-Waxman amendment to the infringement provisions of the Patent Act is 
fairly ambiguous.34  Section 271 generally creates a Federal cause of action against 
“whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, 
within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during 
the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”35  One of the main exceptions to this 
rule is contained in § 271(e),  which states 36
 
unmistakably further the institution’s legitimate business objectives, including educating and enlightening 
students and faculty participating in these projects.”  Id.   
26 Id.  On remand the district court allowed the jury to decide the issue of whether Duke was entitled to a 
research exemption under the clarified standard from the Federal Circuit.  Madey v. Duke Univ., 336 F. 
Supp. 2d 583, 592 (M.D.N.C. 2004). 
27 CHISUM, supra note 16, at § 16.03[a]. 
28 See, e.g., Rai, supra note 9; Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, 
and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141 (2004). 
29 See Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1568 (1997) (discussing the legislative history of 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e)). 
30 H.R. REP. 98-857(II), at 27 (August 1, 1984) (“the provisions of § 202 of the bill [that adds subsection (e) 
to 35 U.S.C. § 271] have the net effect of reversing the holding of the court in Roche Products, Inc. v. 
Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.”).  See also Holly Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984: Fine-Tuning the Balance Between the Interests of Pioneer and Generic Drug 
Manufacturers, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 51 (2003). 
31 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 
(1984). 
32 Id. at 1588. 
33 Id. 
34 In his treatise on patent law, Professor Chisum notes that “Section 271(e)(1)'s awkward wording has 
vexed the courts.”  CHISUM, supra note 16, at § 16.03[1][d][iii]. 
35 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2005). 
36 Other than the research exemption, the only third-party exception within 35 U.S.C. § 271 exempts 
products transformed by subsequent processes or incorporated into other products from liability for 
“import[ing] into the United States or offer[ing] to sell, sell[ing], or us[ing] within the United States a 
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It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell 
within the United States or import into the United States a patented 
invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product 
(as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and 
the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using 
recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other 
processes involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely 
for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or 
sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.37
¶11 This language provides considerable latitude in statutory interpretation.  It opens 
with the inclusive language “make, use, offer to sell, or sell” which has become 
equivalent to every commercial act of infringement.38  The final clause is clearly directed 
to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), but is textually not so limiting — 
“a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.”  39
¶12 The intervening language is the most ambiguous in the statute and the subject of 
the Merck dispute, at least at the Supreme Court.  What is the plain meaning of “solely 
for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information”?40  
“Solely” would seem to indicate that a narrow set of acts qualify for the exemption.  
However, the “reasonably related” requirement broadens the exemption and introduces 
jurisprudential flexibility.41  Qualifying acts are further limited to “the development and 
submission of information.”  The “submission of information” under a law regulating 
drugs is relatively unambiguous, but the development of that information encompasses a 
broad swath of activities that are not easily definable, and not clarified by a 
reasonableness test. 
¶13 Past opinions have delineated certain uses that fell under the reasonably related test 
for the development of information.  In 1994, the New Jersey district court gave 
considerable latitude to the statutory language and focused on the specific research 
involved in the product and patent at issue.42  The Federal Circuit upheld the research 
exemption when the patented invention was primarily used to develop a generic 
formulation of the patented drug.    43
¶14 An alternative structural interpretation of § 271(e)(1) has also been advanced by 
some district courts.  In 2001, the Southern District of New York held that the text of the 
Hatch-Waxman amendment did not indicate a Congressional intent to restrict its 
 
product which is made by a process patented in the United States . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 271(g).   
37 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2005). 
38 See Soehnge, supra note 30, at 58. 
39 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
40 Id. 
41 Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107-08 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding that 
the phrase "solely for uses reasonably related" is less restrictive than other phrases Congress could have 
chosen, such as "use is solely for purposes reasonably related."). 
42 NeoRx Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202 (D.N.J. 1994). 
43 Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003), aff’g 275 F. Supp. 2d 534 
(D.N.J. 2002). 
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application to generic drugs, or drug patents in general.44  Absent Congressional intent to 
the contrary, other subsections of § 271 support an interpretation of § 271(e)(1) to apply 
to all inventions – the limiting factor being whether the information is ultimately 
developed for or submitted to a Federal agency.  45
¶15 The most important decision to interpret § 271(e)(1) prior to Merck KGaA v. 
Integra Lifesciences concerned whether medical devices fell under the statutory 
exemption.46  In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, the Federal Circuit held Class III medical 
devices are within the scope of the statutory exemption.47  Judge Nies wrote the decision 
for a unanimous panel that looked to the legislative history, specifically the fact that 
Congress intended to overrule Roche by enacting § 271(e)(1).48  The court went on to 
reason that neither Roche nor the FDCA were restricted to drug research and approvals.  
Thus, the statutory exemption is likewise not restricted to drug approvals.    49
¶16 The Supreme Court agreed to hear Eli Lilly to consider the scope of the statutory 
research exemption.50  The Court agreed with the Federal Circuit’s broad interpretation of 
the statutory exemption after finding no Congressional purpose to limit the doctrine in the 
legislative history and, more importantly, no reason to limit the doctrine based on the text 
of the enacted law.51  Under this backdrop the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court 
considered the matter at hand.  Once again the highest patent court and the supreme 
judicial body were set to determine whether a certain type of research — in this case pre-
clinical developmental drug research — is exempt from patent infringement liability. 
II. MERCK KGAA, INTEGRA LIFESCIENCES, AND RGD PEPTIDES 
¶17 The use of the RGD tripeptide – named such because it consists of arginine (R), 
glycine (G), and aspartic acid (D) — was initially discovered in 1982 by Dr. Michael 
Pierschbacher at the La Jolla Cancer Research Foundation (LJCRF).52  The first paper 
and corresponding patent did not specify the RGD domain as the critical component of 
the cell adhesion method.53  Rather, the Pierschbacher paper described the primary 
structure of a novel protein known as the cell attachment factor of human plasma 
fibronectin.   The specific mechanism of cellular adhesion was not known at this time.  54 55
 
44 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833(RPP), 2001 WL 1512597, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001). 
45 Id. 
46 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
47 Id. at 406. 
48 Id. at 404-05. 
49 Id. at 405-06. 
50 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S 661 (1990). 
51 Id. at 666-69. 
52 The La Jolla Cancer Research Foundation was renamed the Burnham Institute in 1996. 
53 Michael D. Pierschbacher, Erkki Ruoslahti, Johan Sundelin, Peter Lind & Per A. Peterson, The Cell 
Attachment Domain of Fibronectin, 257 J. BIOL. CHEM. 9593 (1982).  See also U.S. Patent No. 4,517,686. 
54 Pierschbacher, supra note 53, at 9594 (“A computer search for homologies of the sequence of the cell 
attachment fragment with published amino acid sequences revealed no statistically significant homologies 
with any other protein nor with any of the short sections of the sequence of fibronectin previously 
published.”). 
55 The lack of a credible mechanism for the necessity of the RGD domain raises a possible enablement 
issue into the patent chain, but this concern was satisfied by a 1984 Nature article.  Michael D. 
Pierschbacher & Erkki Ruoslahti, Cell Attachment Activity of Fibronectin Can be Duplicated by Small 
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¶18 The oldest patent in the chain at issue was for a biologically derived cell surface 
receptor capable of binding to a peptide containing RGD.56  Subsequent LJCRF patents 
claimed the use of RGD-containing peptides in promoting cell adhesion.57  The most 
expansive patent claims alleged against Merck’s use of RGD peptides were issued in 
1997 in U.S. Patent No. 5,695,997.  58
¶19 In 1987, Dr. David Cheresh of the Scripps Research Institute59 reported the 
recognition of RGD peptides by cell surface receptor proteins, also known as “integrins,” 
in a line of human cancer cells.60  In 1988, Merck KGaA began funding Dr. Cheresh’s 
research into the role of integrins in angiogenesis.61  As a result of this research, Cheresh 
discovered that blocking αVβ3 integrins on endothelial cells inhibits angiogenesis and, 
ultimately, tumor growth.62  The blocking agents, or antagonists, reported by Cheresh 
were a murine monoclonal antibody and a cyclic RGD peptide,63 which was provided by 
Merck.64  These preliminary results led Merck to renew its funding for three years 
beginning in 1995, with a specific goal of developing potential drug candidates.65  This 
research identified two cyclic RGD peptides,66 for which Merck began the process of 
obtaining regulatory approval in 1996.  67
 
Synthetic Fragments of the Molecule, 309 NATURE 30 (1984) (“We conclude from these results and from 
the data presented below that the Arg-Gly-Asp must be maintained to preserve activity, while some 
variation at the [adjacent] position occupied by the serine residue is compatible with [cell adhesion] 
activity.”). 
56 U.S. Patent No. 4,789,734 (1985) contains the single claim:  
A substantially purified cell surface receptor derived from mesenchymal tissue and 
capable of binding to a peptide containing the amino acid sequence Arg-Gly-Asp, 
comprising a glycoprotein composed of at least two polypeptides of about 115 and 125 
kD, respectively, as determined by SDS-PAGE under reducing conditions which 
selectively binds to vitronectin, but not to fibronectin. 
57 In addition to the ‘734 patent, the other four patents in suit are U.S. Patent Nos. 4,988,621, 4,792,525, 
4,879,237, and 5,695,997. 
58 Claim 1 is an exemplary claim in the ‘997 patent: “A method of altering cell attachment activity of cells, 
comprising: contacting the cells with a substantially pure soluble peptide including RGDX where X is an 
amino acid and the peptide has cell attachment activity.” 
59 Then known as the Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation. 
60 See David A. Cheresh & John R. Harper, Arg-Gly-Asp Recognition by a Cell Adhesion Receptor 
Requires Its 130-kDa α Subunit, 262 J. BIOL. CHEM. 1434 (1987); Jeffrey W. Smith &  David A. Cheresh, 
The Arg-Gly-Asp Binding Domain of the Vitronectin Receptor, 263 J. BIOL. CHEM. 18726 (1988); and 
David A. Cheresh, Jeffrey W. Smith, Helen M. Cooper & Vito Quaranta, A Novel Vitronectin Receptor 
Integrin (α β ) is Responsible for Distinct Adhesive Properties of Carcinoma Cells, 57 CELL 59 (1989). v x
61 Telios Pharm., Inc. v. Merck KGaA, No. 96-CV-1307, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24187, at *3-5 (S.D. Cal. 
Sept. 11, 1997). 
62 In 1994, Cheresh reported the reversal of tumor growth in chicken embryos.  See Peter C. Brooks, 
Anthony M.P. Montgomery, Mauricio Rosenfeld, Ralph A. Reisfeld, Tianhua Hu, George Klier & David 
A. Cheresh, Integrin α βv 3 Antagonists Promote Tumor Regression by Inducing Apoptosis of Angiogenic 
Blood Vessels, 79 CELL 1157 (1994) [hereinafter Brooks, Antagonists]; Peter C. Brooks, Richard A.F. 
Clark & David A. Cheresh, Requirement of Vascular Integrin α βv 3 for Angiogenesis, 264 SCIENCE 569 
(1994). 
63 Brooks, Antagonists, supra note 62 at 1162. 
64 Id. 
65 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 198 (2005).  See also Brief for the Petitioner 
at 12, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (No. 03-1237). 
66 Merck, 545 U.S. at 198. 
67 Id. at 199. 
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A. Integra Wins over the Jury After Consideration of the Common Law and Statutory 
Research Exemption 
¶20 In 1996, Telios Pharmaceuticals,68 Integra, and Burnham learned of the Merck-
Scripps research agreement and approached Merck to negotiate a mutually beneficial 
license agreement.69  After Merck declined the license, the patent owners filed suit in the 
Southern District of California against Merck, Scripps, and Cheresh for patent 
infringement.70  After the district court denied Merck’s motion for summary judgment 
based on the statutory research exemption,  a jury trial was held.71 72  The district court 
denied Merck’s post-trial motion to dismiss,73  but agreed that its pre-1995 basic research 
activities fell under the common law research exemption.74  The jury then awarded 
Integra $15 million in damages based on a reasonable royalty calculation.75  After the 
district court denied Merck’s post-trial motion for a judgment as a matter of law, Merck 
appealed to the Federal Circuit.  76
B. The Federal Circuit Splits over § 271(e)(1) 
¶21 The panel of Judges Newman, Rader, and Prost heard arguments and then issued a 
split decision that upheld the trial court, with Judge Rader writing for the majority and 
Judge Newman dissenting in part.77  The majority opinion takes up the issue of whether 
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) should be extended to provide a safe harbor for pre-clinical 
research on experimental drug compounds.  The majority engaged in textual 
interpretation with a focus on the limiting word “solely”:  
At the outset, this statutory language strictly limits the exemption “solely” 
to uses with a reasonable relationship to FDA procedures.  The term 
“solely” places a constraint on the inquiry into the limits of the exemption.  
 
68 Telios Pharmaceuticals, Inc., was founded in 1987 to commercialize integrin-mediated cell adhesion for 
tissue regeneration.  Telios filed bankruptcy in 1995 and was acquired by Integra Lifesciences Corp. later 
that year.  See Brief for the Petitioner at 20, supra note 65; Bankruptcy Court Confirms Reorganization 
Plan, Standard & Poor's Daily News (July 20, 1995), 1995 WLNR 578102. 
69 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
70 Id.  See also Telios Pharm., Inc. v. Merck KGaA, No. 96-CV-1307, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24187, at *4 
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 1997). 
71 Telios, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24187, at *2, *5. 
72 At trial, Merck did not contest the district court’s claim contruction, which held its cyclic RGD peptides 
were within the scope of the Integra patents.  Integra, 331 F.3d at 861.  Subsequently, “the district court 
granted Scripps’ and Dr. Cheresh’s motion to dismiss.”  Id. at 863. 
73 Id. at 864. 
74 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 199 (2005). 
75 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  The Federal Circuit 
found the damage calculation to be erroneous and the reasonable royalty rate was reduced on remand.  
Because of an earlier date of hypothetical negotiation and the overall value of Telios in its sale to Integra, 
the damages were reduced to $6.375 million.  Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, No. 96CV1307-
B(AJB), 2004 WL 2284001, at *4-9 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2004). 
76 Integra, 331 F.3d at 862. 
77 Id. 
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The exemption cannot extend at all beyond uses with the reasonable 
relationship specified in § 271(e)(1).    78
¶22 Thus, the court narrowly interpreted the operative language, “reasonably related to 
the development and submission of information,” to “[a]ctivities that...directly produce 
information for the FDA,” with limited exceptions for “activities that are not themselves 
the experiments that produce FDA information.”79  The court held that Dr. Cheresh’s 
work did not qualify, because it “was not clinical testing to supply information to the 
FDA, but only general biomedical research to identify new pharmaceutical 
compounds.”    80
¶23 Despite this narrow statutory interpretation, the majority opinion was clearly 
informed by the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Judge Rader declared that 
“the express objective of the 1984 Act was to facilitate the immediate entry of safe, 
effective generic drugs into the marketplace upon expiration of a pioneer drug patent.”81  
Ultimately, Judge Rader countered Merck’s interpretation by stating that § 271(e)(1) 
“was meant to reverse the effects of Roche under limited circumstances . . . .”  82
¶24 Judge Newman dissented from the majority’s interpretation of the common law and 
statutory research exemptions.83  Her approach was based on the following factors: (1) 
policy concerns centered on the roots of the patent system; (2) stare decisis of both the 
common law and statutory research exemption; and (3) a textual interpretation of the 
statute in view of the legislative intent. 
¶25 In Judge Newman’s view, the basic policy behind the patent system is the 
fundamental patent bargain.84  She admonishes the majority for “disapprov[ing] and 
essentially eliminat[ing] the common law research exemption”:  85
 
78 Id. at 866 (emphasis added) (further noting that “the statutory language limits the reach of that 
relationship test”). 
79 Id. 
80 Id.  Judge Rader further noted, “The FDA has no interest in the hunt for drugs that may or may not later 
undergo clinical testing for FDA approval.”  Id. 
81 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 866-67 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  See also Glaxo, Inc. 
v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act of 1984...legislation designed to benefit makers of generic drugs, research-based 
pharmaceutical companies, and not incidentally the public.”); Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Laboratories., Inc., 
324 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“To attain a balance between the interests of brand name 
pharmaceutical companies and generic drug manufacturers, Congress, as part of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
legislated that a generic drug manufacturer may, without liability for infringement, use a drug claimed in a 
patent or a method of using a drug claimed in a patent in order to prepare an application for FDA approval 
of a generic drug.”); Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(“[T]he Act specifically provides an ANDA applicant immunity from allegations of infringement for acts 
that are necessary in preparing an ANDA.”). 
82 Integra, 331 F.3d at 867.  The rule promulgated by the Federal Circuit is best summarized by Judge 
Rader: “[The Act] does not, for instance, expand the phrase ‘reasonably related’ to embrace all stages of 
development of new drugs merely because those new products will also need FDA approval.”  Id. 
83 Id. at 872. 
84 Id. at 873 (citing the two competing “purpose[s] of a patent system” as “provid[ing] a financial incentive 
to create new knowledge” and “serv[ing] to add to the body of published scientific/technological 
knowledge”). 
85 Id. 
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The requirement of disclosure of the details of patented inventions 
facilitates further knowledge and understanding of what was done by the 
patentee, and may lead to further technologic advance.  The right to 
conduct research to achieve such knowledge need not, and should not, 
await expiration of the patent.  That is not the law, and it would be a 
practice impossible to administer.86
¶26 Judge Newman, herself a research chemist, appears deferential to the considerable 
scientific progress made by Dr. Cheresh, which significantly improved the biological 
understanding of cell adhesion, the role of RGD peptides, and angiogenesis.    87
¶27 The basic structure of the argument is that the common law research exemption 
promotes the progress of science and technology by “requir[ing] full disclosure of the 
invention, including details of enabling experiments and technical drawings and best 
modes and preferred embodiments, even commercial sources of special components.”88  
However, Judge Newman recognizes that there must be a limit to the common law 
research exemption.89  In this respect, Judge Newman analogizes the common law 
exemption to the fair use doctrine in copyright law, and is particularly adverse to 
restricting the doctrine purely on the basis of “an ultimate goal or hope of profit.”  90
¶28 Returning to Justice Story’s famous words in Whittemore, Judge Newman explains 
that “philosophical experiments” in this context “was referring to ‘natural philosophy,’ 
the term then used for what we today call ‘science’.”91  The allowance of a flexible 
common law exemption for research that falls under one of the two Whittemore 
categories has become a fundamental aspect of our patent system.92  Historically, the 
courts “have applied the research exemption when no commercial purpose was 
demonstrated for the research.”93  Since the exemption has been a part of the common 
law for nearly 200 years, presumably its doctrinal effects have been incorporated into the 
economics of the patent system.   Furthermore, “[a] rule that this information cannot be 94
 
86 Id. 
87  Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 874 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“As this research 
progressed, so did the scientific understanding of these peptide products . . . .”).   
88 Id. at 875-76 (“Were all research using RGD peptides prohibited until the Integra/Telios patents expired, 
not even the patent owner would benefit, for the patented products had failed in Telios’ hands, leaving the 
patents valueless until Scripps and Merck made their discoveries as to the cyclic peptides and their anti-
angiogenic properties.”). 
89 Id. at 876 (”Setting the boundaries of a common law exemption requires careful understanding of the 
mechanisms of the creation, development, and use of technical knowledge, and of today’s complexity of 
interactions among invention and innovating fruits of invention.”). 
90 Id.   
91 Id. at 875, note 8. 
92 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 875 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting Justice 
Story’s second annunciation of this principle in Sawin v. Guild, 21 Fed. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813)). 
93 Id. (citing Chesterfield v. United States, 141 Ct.Cl. 838 (1958) and Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Manufacturing 
Co., 13 F. Supp. 697 (D.Colo. 1935)). 
94 Id. (“Today’s accelerated technological advance is based in large part on knowledge of the details of 
patented inventions and how they are made and used.”).  In footnote 10, Judge Newman recognizes the 
“sweeping” rule created in the recent Madey decision.  Id. at 878, n.10 (“I do not disagree with that 
decision on its facts; I disagree only with its sweeping dictum, and its failure to distinguish investigation 
into patented things, as has always been permitted, and investigation using patented things, as has never 
been permitted.”). 
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investigated without permission of the patentee is belied by the routine appearance of 
improvements on patented subject matter . . . .”  95
¶29 Judge Newman’s dissent further criticizes the majority opinion for basing its 
decision heavily on 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) when both parties conceded that the statutory 
exemption applies to Merck’s Investigational New Drug (IND) Application.96  
Nonetheless, she agrees with Judge Rader that “the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor [does not] 
reach back down the chain of experimentation to embrace development and identification 
of new drugs,”  but disagrees with the application of this principle.97 98  Judge Newman 
also reads into the statutory exemption a legislative intent to restrict its application to 
generic drugs,99 but finds this inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Eli 
Lilly,   which significantly broadened the reasonableness test.  100 101
C. Scalia’s Textualist Merck Opinion 
¶30 Consistent with his broad textualist reading of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) in Eli Lilly,102 
Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the Federal Circuit majority 
opinion.103  Scalia interprets the reasonableness test without the deference Judge Rader 
gave to the limiting modifier “solely.”104  With respect to the appropriate interpretation of 
the reasonableness test, the court “decline[s] to read the ‘reasonable relation’ requirement 
so narrowly as to render § 271(e)(1)’s stated protection of activities leading to FDA 
approval for all drugs illusory.”105  Justice Scalia gives short shrift to any myopic reading 
of legislative intent,  instead establishing: 106
Properly construed, § 271(e)(1) leaves adequate space for experimentation 
and failure on the road to regulatory approval: At least where a drugmaker 
has a reasonable basis for believing that a patented compound may work, 
 
95 Id. at 875. 
96 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 877 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
97 Id. (quoting the majority opinion at 865-66).  Neither Judge Rader nor Judge Newman cite to any 
authority for reading legislative history into statutes like 35 U.S.C. § 271.  See Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 
496 U.S. 543, 569 n.27 (1990) (“Unlike scholarly commentators, we have a duty to be faithful to 
congressional intent when interpreting statutes, and are not free to consider whether, or how, the statute 
should be rewritten.”). 
98 Integra, 331 F.3d at 877 (noting “the territory that the Scripps/Merck research traversed, from laboratory 
experimentation to development of data for submission to the FDA, was either exempt exploratory 
research, or was immunized by § 271(e)(1)”). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc. 496 U.S 661 (1990). 
102 See Id. 
103 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
104 Id. at 202 n.6 (“Although the Court of Appeals’ opinion suggests in places that § 271(e)(1)’s exemption 
from infringement is limited to research conducted in clinical trials...we do not understand it to have 
adopted that position.”). 
105 Id. at 202 (“As an initial matter, we think it apparent from the statutory text that § 271(e)(1)’s exemption 
from infringement extends to all uses of patented inventions that are reasonably related to the development 
and submission of any information under the FDCA.”). 
106 Id. (“Congress did not limit § 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor to the development of information for inclusion in 
a submission to the FDA; nor did it create an exemption applicable only to the research relevant to filing an 
ANDA for approval of a generic drug.”). 
   145
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 0 6  
 
through a particular biological process, to produce a particular 
physiological effect, and uses the compound in research that, if successful, 
would be appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA, that use is 
“reasonably related” to the “development and submission of information 
under...Federal law.”107
¶31 Justice Scalia finds support for his interpretation in economic policy concerns and 
the nature of the FDA and the pharmaceutical industry.  He notes the uncertainty 
attendant to the development of new drug compounds,108 wherein the only way to “know 
at the outset that a particular compound will be the subject of an eventual application to 
the FDA [is] if the active ingredient in the drug being tested is identical” to an FDA 
approved drug.109  This uncertainty has been recognized by the FDA, whose regulations 
“provide only that ‘[t]he amount of information on a particular drug that must be 
submitted in an IND’” depends on many factors.110  Furthermore, Justice Scalia cites the 
Government’s amicus brief, on behalf of the FDA, in support of the proposition that “the 
use of patented compounds in preclinical studies is protected under § 271(e)(1) as long as 
there is a reasonable basis for believing that the experiments will produce ‘the types of 
information that are relevant to an IND or NDA.’”111  Justice Scalia also discounts Judge 
Rader’s normative policy arguments with respect to the extension of the rule to research 
tools, because the issue was never raised by Integra and need not be a focus of this 
case.  112
III. A REALIST APPROACH TO MERCK AND THE STATUTORY EXEMPTION 
¶32 The statutory research exemption has been a contentious issue ever since Congress 
intervened in what it perceived as a narrowing of the common law doctrine by the 
Federal Circuit.113  In light of the Supreme Court’s decision, it is important to reassess the 
state of the statutory and common law research exemptions and the gloss imparted to the 
doctrines by the Federal Circuit.  The Supreme Court’s holding has broad implications 
that should inform the Federal Circuit’s view of this and similar doctrines going forward.  
As the number of articles published in the two years between the Federal Circuit’s 
decision and the Supreme Court ruling attests, the importance of the decision cannot be 
underestimated for its legal and economic impact. 
 
107 Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)). 
108 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 207 (2005) (“many of the uncertainties that 
exist with respect to the selection of a specific drug exist as well with respect to the decision of what 
research to include in an IND or NDA”). 
109 Id.  Justice Scalia implies that restricting § 271(e)(1) to generic drugs is inconsistent with the legislative 
record, which specifically rules out applying the Hatch-Waxman Act solely to “identical” drug 
formulations, instead opting for the less restrictive modifier “the same as the listed drug.”  H.R. REP. 98-
857(I), at 21. 
110 Merck, 545 U.S. at 207 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 312.22(b)). 
111 Id. at 2383-84 (quoting Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae at 23). 
112 Id. at 2382 n.7 (agreeing with Judge Newman’s opinion that studying a research tool is different from 
using the tool in research). 
113 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(II), at 27. 
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A. The Positivists Have It 
¶33 Most of the scholarly research on the research exemptions has been concerned with 
the positive effects of changes in the patent law, assuming that any changes in the law 
result in behavioral changes in the market for patented inventions.  In Integra 
Lifesciences v. Merck KGaA, the Federal Circuit panel majority adopted the positive view 
that its decision would change the manner in which research would be conducted.114  The 
majority explicitly stated that they were trying to protect “the exclusive rights of 
patentees owning biotechnology tool patents.”115  Returning to the original conception of 
the common law exemption, as reflected in the legislative history,116 the Federal Circuit 
applied a de minimis test to Merck’s actions.  117
¶34 This rationale is a normative interpretation that values strong protections for patent 
rights and recognizes the role industry-forcing doctrines can have.118  By protecting the 
rights of research tool patent owners, the Federal Circuit extended its research exemption 
rule through dicta to “express a view about whether, or to what extent, § 271(e)(1) 
exempts from infringement the use of ‘research tools’ in the development of information 
for the regulatory process.”119  Therefore, the Supreme Court’s ruling should be a boon to 
companies “willing to use patented research tools without a license while the research 
tool industry is left wondering what value remains in their patents.”   120
¶35 In line with the majority decision at the Federal Circuit, many commentators 
viewed the Integra decision through a positivist lens.121  Professor Dreyfuss argues that 
the decision encroaches on the norms of scientific research and proposes a waiver system 
in response.122  The positivist component of this argument builds on Professor 
Eisenberg’s theory that the norms of science, e.g. the societal benefits obtained from an 
open exchange of ideas, are damaged by overzealous patent protection.   The proposed 123
 
114 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 866-68 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
115 Id. at 867 (focusing on the fact that “patented tools often facilitate general research to identify candidate 
drugs, as well as downstream safety-related experiment on those drugs”). 
116 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(II), at 30 (justifying the constitutionality of the Hatch-Waxman Act because 
simply “test[ing] the drug for purposes of submitting data to the FDA for approval” is no more than a de 
minimis interference with the patentee’s rights). 
117 Integra, 331 F.3d at 867.  
118 Id.  
119 In his decision overruling this decision, Justice Scalia did not address the issue of research tool patents.  
He noted that “[r]espondents have never argued the RGD peptides were used at Scripps as research tools, 
and it is apparent from the record that they were not.”  Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 
U.S. 193, 205 n.7 (2005). 
120 Stanton J. Lovenworth & Melissa P. Cohen, The Research Tool Conundrum: ‘Merck’ Decision Leaves 
Open Questions on Boundaries of Safe Harbor, N.Y. L.J., October 17, 2005, at 4 (noting that the Merck 
decision “most certainly invites further suits to clarify the outer boundaries of the safe harbor and whether 
and to what extent § 271(e)(1) exempts the use of research tools”). 
121 See, e.g., Tanuja V. Garde, Supporting Innovation in Targeted Treatments: Licenses of Right to NIH-
Funded Research Tools, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 249 (2005); Strandburg, supra note 1; 
Alison Ladd, Note,Integra v. Merck: Effects on the Cost and Innovation of New Drug Products, 13 J.L. & 
POL'Y 311 (2005); Tao Huang, Note, The Experimental Purpose Doctrine and Biomedical Research, 11 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 97 (2004). 
122 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Use 
Defense Arrived, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 470-71 (2004). 
123 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 
Yale L.J. 177 (1987) (discussing the possibility of synchronizing the doctrines of basic scientific research 
and patent law). 
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waiver system is similar and complementary to compulsory licenses proposals,124 except 
the waivers would only be available to academic institutions and would be subject to 
limitations on future disclosure and commercialization of innovations.  125
¶36 An alternative proposal by Professor Strandburg sides with Judge Newman’s 
dissenting opinion in Merck, particularly the distinction drawn between “experimenting 
with” and “experimenting on” patented technology.126  The focus of this proposal is again 
a positivist view that the panel majority decision will significantly affect research activity 
and unnecessarily resorts to “linguistic gymnastics” to protect research tools.127  
Professor Sandburg’s analysis finds that research tool patent owners would be able to 
control the progress of research to the detriment of scientific progress under the panel 
majority’s decision.  128
B. Legal Realism and the Future of the Research Exemption 
¶37 The imparting of a de minimis qualification to § 271(e)(1) represents the normative 
consideration that a patent is an absolute property right for which easements should not 
be granted unless they are de minimis.  The Federal Circuit’s language in this respect can 
only be read as a normative proscription, because the statutory text contains no references 
to the extent of the alleged infringement.  In the context of the legislative history, de 
minimis infringement is neither the more general statutory purpose nor the justification 
and explanation of any single provision of the statute.129  Generic drug approval certainly 
does not have a de minimis impact on the pharmaceutical industry.  Rather, the de 
minimis argument is raised as one among a few counterarguments to the contention that § 
271(e)(1) violates the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.130  Presumably this view 
assures patent owners that their rights are secure and encourages patenting activity.  131
¶38 The Federal Circuit should take heed of the second Supreme Court opinion to 
interpret this paragraph of the patent law with a strict textualist approach.   Table 1 132
 
124 A compulsory license scheme would force an arms length negotiation between the holder of a patent 
right and a license right.  See Garde, supra note 121, at 280-83.   
125 Dreyfuss, supra note 122, at 472-72.   
126 Strandburg, supra note 121, at 88-90.  See also Kevin Iles, A Comparative Analysis of the Impact of 
Experimental Use Exemptions in Patent Law on Incentives to Innovate, 4 NW. J. TECH. AND INTELL. PROP. 
61, 82 (2005) (“a distinction must be drawn between experimenting with a patented invention and 
experimenting on a patented invention so as to protect the interests of the research tool patentee”). 
127 Strandburg, supra note 121, at 85.  One of the main positivist worries after the Federal Circuit’s decision 
was that research activity would move overseas to countries where research exemptions were more firmly 
embedded in the patent law.  See Ladd, supra note 121, at 353-55.   
128 Strandburg, supra note 121, at 146-50.   
129 The general purpose of the statute as recited by Congress is “to make available more low cost generic 
drugs by establishing a generic drug approval procedure for pioneer drugs.”  H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 
14. 
130 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(II), at 29 (“It is alleged by some witnesses that the provisions of the bill which 
permit the limited testing of drugs while they are on patent in order assist in the preparation of an 
abbreviated new drug application is a ‘taking’ without just compensation in violation of the requirements of 
the Fifth Amendment.”). 
131 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Empirical Analysis of the Patent Court, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
111, 128 (2004) (concluding that the “pro-patent leanings” of the Federal Circuit “has had a significant 
effect on patent activity”). 
132 Other than Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences, the Supreme Court considered the statutory research 
exemption in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc. and adopted a similarly broad textualist view in a decision 
authored by Justice Scalia.  496 U.S. 661 (1990). 
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illustrates the level of disagreement among the court’s judges over the appropriate 
interpretation of this doctrine.133  For example, one of the initial cases at the Federal 
Circuit to deal with the research exemption and generic drugs noted: 
We do not read the statute as implying any such limitation.  In the first 
place, if the language is clear, the plain meaning of the statute will be 
regarded as conclusive.  While legislative history may aid our 
understanding of the function and purposes of the statute, and in cases of 
doubt assist in interpretation of the language, when the legislature has 
clearly spoken the law, the court's duty is to enforce it as written.  The 
statute at issue here only requires that the making, using or selling of the 
patented invention be solely for uses reasonably related to FDA 
approval.134
¶39 Table 1 illustrates that this view has been the norm in the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of the statutory exemption since 1990.  The Integra decision was an outlier 
in narrowing the applicability of the research exemption.  In every other case, the Federal 
Circuit has acknowledged the broad textualist view it announced and the Supreme Court 
affirmed in Eli Lilly.   135
¶40  Perhaps in Integra the Federal Circuit saw potential abuse of a broad research 
exemption by innovator pharmaceutical companies,136 or was concerned about 
diminishing the utility of research tools patents.137  Regardless of the rationale, the court 
looked to facts beyond whether the Cheresh data was reasonably likely to be submitted to 
the FDA, which was conceded by the parties. 
C. The Research Exemption Aligns with Economic Realities in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry 
¶41 If one accepts the positivist approach to the research exemption, will Merck v. 
Integra lead to a boom in fearless innovator research?  Infringement liability will still 
protect the patent owner after FDA approval and will limit outright decisions to 
infringe.   In fact, the product in question would likely have infringed according to the 138
 
133 Professors John Allison and Mark Lemley conducted an empirical study of all patent infringement 
decisions at the Federal Circuit during the 1989 term and discovered only minor differences in the overall 
results between two groups of judges – one with prior patent experience and one without.  The differences 
were more significant when broken down by doctrine.  John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal 
Circuit Judges Vote in Patent Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745 (2000). 
134 Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
135 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aff’d, 496 U.S 661 (1990). 
136 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The safe harbor does 
not reach any exploratory research that may rationally form only a predicate for future FDA clinical 
tests.”). 
137 Id. (explaining that the decision avoids “swallow[ing] the whole benefit of the Patent Act for some 
categories of biotechnological inventions”). 
138 Eric E. Johnson, Calibrating Patent Lifetimes, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 269, 290 
(2006) (“Where the pharmaceutical industry ... maintains tremendous incentive to innovate despite having 
patent duration effectively shortened by approximately one-third, there is strong reason to believe that the 
incentive provided by the patent system may be much more than is necessary for this or other industries.”). 
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district court’s claim construction, but Merck had not marketed it yet.139  This raises the 
interesting question of whether Merck’s due diligence was inadequate.  Very few firms 
will take advantage of the ruling’s expansion of the doctrine, because the threat of post-
clinical litigation is too great to risk expending resources on development.  Therefore, the 
positivist view, while technically accurate, is of little consequence to the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
¶42 The Supreme Court’s position is also supported by the economic realities of the 
pharmaceutical industry.  While the Court did not cloud its textualist argument with 
economic concerns, there are overtones of these considerations.  As it is with any bill that 
has a seminal impact on an important industry, Congress was clearly concerned about the 
economics of the pharmaceutical industry when it passed the Hatch-Waxman Act.    140
¶43 Four arguments support the premise that the Supreme Court’s Merck decision is 
economically preferable to the Federal Circuit’s approach to the research exemption.  
First, the facts of Merck and evidence from the industry demonstrate that licenses are not 
effective in pre-clinical drug research.  Second, a broader research exemption will not 
significantly affect the future value of most drug patents.  Third, the burden of a limited 
exemption stifles research into new drug uses, and the market value of innovator research 
is arguably more important than generic research.  Finally, the concern about the impact 
on research tool patents is minimized by two factors: the sanctioned research is into, not 
using, patented technology and patents have a smaller impact on research tools and 
instruments than on drug development. 
¶44 Licenses are a fundamental part of the rents obtained from intellectual property, but 
their appropriability is highly industry dependent.  Merck KGaA sponsored the Scripps 
research without seeking a license from Integra or Burnham.141  This could have occurred 
because Merck believed that it could rely on the common law research exemption, which 
pre-Madey would have encompassed most investigational research at educational and 
non-profit institutions.  It is also possible that Merck was not aware of the RGD patent 
portfolio.  But that is difficult to rely on as a due diligence defense, because the specific 
RGD sequence was broadly claimed in the ‘734 patent and Dr. Cheresh’s decision to use 
RGD peptides was clearly informed by the Burnham work.142  Presuming that Merck 
conducted the appropriate due diligence prior to launching its research program, we can 
assume that either the company held an honest belief that a research exemption would 
apply or the applicable patents were invalid or not infringed.   
¶45 The costs of obtaining a license prior to investigational work were significant given 
the uncertainty associated with early stage drug development.  Institutional costs and 
other externalities could have significantly increased the amount Merck expended over 
the ten years it supported Cheresh’s research.  Additionally, Merck would risk willful 
infringement if a license were sought and denied.  The Federal Circuit decision would 
 
139 Merck contested the district court’s claim construction that its cyclic RGD peptide was within the scope 
of Integra’s claims.  The Federal Circuit reviewed this holding de novo and affirmed the district court’s 
claim construction.  See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 868-69 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
140 H.R. REP. 98-857(II), at 4 (discussing the anti-competitive effects of the FDA’s generic drug approval 
process at the time of the Hatch-Waxman bill). 
141 Brief for the Petitioner at 21, supra note 65. 
142 Cheresh repeatedly cites to the work of Pierschbacher et al. in his scientific publications.  See supra 
notes 60 and 62. 
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require Merck and Cheresh to obtain a license from the patent owners even before 
conducting experiments to determine whether RGD peptides inhibit angiogenesis.  This 
presents a significant hurdle to the development of new applications for existing 
compounds, which is the precise issue attacked in the anti-commons approach.  143
¶46 Like many other industries, most of the innovation in the pharmaceutical industry 
depends on existing disclosures and represents incremental improvements to existing 
technology.144  In recent years, innovation activity has shifted away from models of 
absolute novelty to a model of routine exploitation of existing technology, particularly in 
the biopharmaceutical context.145  This type of innovation places greater emphasis on the 
interactive and collective nature of innovation processes, which are fueled by access to 
existing disclosures.146  The research exemptions improve access to existing technologies 
and do not limit appropriability of existing patent rights once the innovative technology is 
marketed.147  As Judge Newman notes, the prevalence of improvements to existing 
technology in the pharmaceutical industry belies the assumption that licensing activity 
increases appropriability of existing rights.  148
¶47 As noted by Landes and Posner, “incremental increases in patent protection are 
unlikely to influence inventive activity significantly and incremental reductions might 
actually enhance economic welfare.”149  Ultimately, if pharmaceutical firms do not seek 
licenses as part of their development models, the Federal Circuit’s insistence on this 
behavior does not serve the patent owners or the public good.  The patent owners will not 
be served because the industry is not likely to be forced into this behavior, as 
demonstrated by Merck’s pre-development activities.  Social welfare will be diminished 
by avoidance and circumvention of liability, which will not efficiently allocate the best 
resources, i.e. existing disclosures, to the task of new drug development. 
¶48 In addition to the behavioral economic view, the present discount value of existing 
patent rights is relatively unaffected by the Merck research exemption.  At a discount rate 
of 10%,150 the present value of a patent right with a twenty-year term, assuming there is a 
market for the invention, is 85% of its value with perfect appropriability.151  However, 
one cannot assume that pioneer drug compound patents have a twenty-year term.  Even 
 
143 See Mireles, supra note 28, at 178 (“The licensing of research tools that may have a broad application to 
many research problems also provides substantial risks to private firms.”).  See also Eisenberg & Heller, 
supra note 9, at 699. 
144 See Dominique Foray, Knowledge Distribution and the Institutional Infrastructure: The Role of 
Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GLOBAL COMPETITION 77 (1995). 
145 Id. (citing a study by Hermitte and Joly of innovation in the biotech sector). 
146 Id. at 112. 
147 Critics of stronger patent laws for drug innovations have pointed to the predominance of academic and 
federal drug R&D in producing therapeutic innovations, largely under the protective blanket of a research 
exemption.  See LANDES, supra note 2, at 313. 
148 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 878 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
149 LANDES, supra note 2, at 327.  The value of patent rights account for only 10-15% of national R&D 
expenditures and have a fairly limited impact on innovative activity.  Id. (citing data from Zvi Griliches, 
Ariel Pakes & Bronwyn H. Hall, The Value of Patents as Indicators of Inventive Activity, in ECONOMIC 
POLICY AND TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE 97, 120 (Partha Dasgupta and Paul Stoneman eds. 1987)). 
150 The cost of capital in the pharmaceutical industry hovers around 9-12%.  See Henry G. Grabowski & 
John M. Vernon, Returns to R&D on New Drug Introductions in the 1980s, 13 J. HEALTH ECON. 383, 386-
87 (1994). 
151 LANDES, supra note 2, at 296. 
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with the patent-term restoration component of the Hatch-Waxman Act,152 the average 
effective term of a pharmaceutical patent is about eleven years,153 which reduces the 
present value of the invention to 65%.  Overall R&D costs make up about 30% of the 
present value of drug innovations, and the internal rate of return in the pharmaceutical 
industry is about 11% on R&D investments.154  The issue is not whether this level of 
appropriability is fair to the patent owner, but whether the research exemption has a 
significant effect on the present value of the patent right.  This issue concerns at least two 
important factors: incorporation of the exemption in the discount rate and effect on 
supply and demand elasticity. 
¶49 Assuming the discount rate patentees use when assessing the market for a 
pharmaceutical treatment is relatively empirical, the research exemptions are 
incorporated.  The most accurate and safest discount rate to apply – the one most relevant 
to investors – is the historical rate obtained from a regressive analysis based on empirical 
data, with fewer inherent assumptions than a rate obtained ab initio.155  Since the research 
exemption has been a long-standing part of the existing law and is a de facto 
characteristic of the pharmaceutical industry, any historical analysis that incorporates 
data older than 2003, arguably until the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision, will incorporate 
this assumption. 
¶50 Residual demand elasticity, as a ratio of supply and demand elasticity to overall 
supply, is the most important factor in pricing models for patented products,156 because 
uncertainty in demand determines the marginal cost for imitators — whether they 
nominally infringe the patent or circumnavigate the claims by designing around their 
scope.  In general, demand elasticity is low in the pharmaceutical industry, presumably 
because of the difficulty of imitating a drug compound patent.157  The situation in reality 
is not so simple, because the rules of patentability often restrict patent protection to a 
narrow family of compounds, thereby increasing potential for circumventing a patent’s 
claim by developing a novel compound with comparable bioactivity.   
 
152 The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 provided for the latter as well as 
the former, which is the subject of this comment.  Basically, the Act amended the Food Drug and Cosmetic 
Act to allow for extension of the statutory patent term by the amount of time required for a new drug to 
navigate the FDA approval process.  Pub. L. No. 98-417. 
153 See Michelle Meadows, Greater Access to Generic Drugs, FDA CONSUMER, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2003/503_drug.html.  Analysis of the revenue and cash flow activity of 
patented new drug compounds supports an empirical eleven-year monopoly – the year in which revenues 
and cash flows reach their peak.  See also Grabowski, supra note 150, at 391. 
154 Notably, pharmaceutical returns are not much higher than the cost of capital, indicating a “model of 
rivalrous R&D competition” by pharmaceutical firms.  Henry Grabowski, John Vernon & Joseph DiMasi, 
Returns on R&D for 1990s New Drug Introductions, http://www.dklevine.com/archive/grabow-
randd_returns.pdf, at 2 (March 2002).  See also Grabowski, supra at note 150, at 400-402 (noting that 
nearly all studies find internal rate of return in the pharmaceutical industry are within 1% of net cost of 
capital); F.M. Scherer, The Link Between Gross Profitability and Pharmaceutical R&D Spending, 20 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 216 (2001) (studying profitability in the pharmaceutical industry empirically). 
155 See Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106 
(1990); Paul Klemperer, How broad should the scope of patent protection be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 113 
(1990). 
156 The patentee’s profit-maximizing ratio equals [εd/s + εs(1-s)/s]/[εd/s + εs(1-s)/s - s]; where εd and εs are 
the demand and supply elasticities, respectively, and s is the patentee’s output.  Therefore, lower supply 
and demand elasticity lead to higher profits for the patentee.  See LANDES, supra note 1, at 299. 
157 N. Edward Coulson & Bruce C. Stuart, Insurance Choice and the Demand for Prescription Drugs, 61 S. 
ECON. J. 1146, 1146-57 (1995) (demand in the pharmaceutical industry is nearly inelastic). 
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¶51 The research exemption can increase the potential for designing around existing 
patents through decreased research and development costs when imitators take advantage 
of patent disclosures.  This type of activity is not necessarily within the scope of Merck, 
because simply using a patented compound as a research tool without a reasonable 
expectation of a submission to the FDA was not considered by the Court.158  Even so, it is 
not likely that this activity has a significant impact on supply and demand elasticity for 
the patented product.  Consider the RGD peptide example: Whereas Integra employed 
RGD peptides as cell adhesion promoters, its competitors and imitators would experience 
a marginal cost commensurate with developing competitive cell adhesion promoters.  The 
demand elasticity for cell adhesion promoters would be unaffected by Cheresh’s research 
exemption. 
¶52 Ultimately, the research exemption encourages the creation of new markets for 
already granted patents.  This increases the future appropriability of unanticipated value 
as a result of the research exemption and does not affect residual demand elasticity in the 
existing market.  The research exemption encourages innovation, which in turn increases 
social benefits, with little effect on the value of the private right.  Scalia’s decision 
establishes a more specific rule and sets forth a textualist position with respect to the 
patent laws that decreases the uncertainty the rent seeker will encounter.  Uncertainty in 
experimental use doctrine discourages innovation and diminishes appropriability of 
patented inventions.  159
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶53 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences represents one case in a continuing struggle 
over the position of the research exemption in U.S. patent law.  This issue may not be 
solved soon, with the common law doctrine perhaps dependent on panel composition, 
although a majority of judges favor a narrow interpretation.160   In a broader context, 
Merck v. Integra also reinforces the Supreme Court’s textualist interpretation of the 
Patent Act.  This should be a welcome indicator to firms who were startled by the Federal 
Circuit’s earlier decision.   
¶54 In the future, the Federal Circuit should be mindful of the judges’ normative 
tendencies and adhere to the plain language of the statute when it requires interpretation.  
The statutory research exemption is entrenched in the Patent Act and must be given its 
broadest interpretation within the Congressional design.  Additionally, the court may 
 
158 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206 (2005) (“It does not follow . . . that § 
271(e)(1)'s exemption from infringement categorically excludes either (1) experimentation on drugs that 
are not ultimately the subject of an FDA submission or (2) use of patented compounds in experiments that 
are not ultimately submitted to the FDA.”). 
159 JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES § 8.50 (2005) (“[N]othing in the 
current Patent Act or any earlier Patent Act ... suggests that it is also the purpose of patent law to permit an 
inventor to capture the value of all subsequent complementary inventions or to permit a patent owner to 
prohibit experiments necessary to develop substitute inventions.”).  See also Iles, supra note 126, at 82 
(noting the current commercial/non-commercial distinction is incongruous with economic realities in 
R&D). 
160 A detailed study of the panel dependence of research exemption decisions is probably unfeasible for 
lack of data and beyond the scope of this paper.  A number of researchers have begun empirical legal realist 
studies of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence.  See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the 
Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 
(2004). 
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consider economic rationales, because a patent is fundamentally an economic monopoly.  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision in Merck is supported by the economic reality 
of the pharmaceutical industry, in which risk and capital costs are high and concomitant 
returns are realized by the most agile firms. 
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Table 1.  Summary of Federal Circuit’s § 271(e)(1) Decisions. 
Judge Case Issue Holding 
Integra  (2003) Rader, Prost Preclinical 
research of a new 
drug 





 (2003) Preclinical 
research of a new 
drug 
Common law exemption 
applies to preclinical 
research and § 271(e)(1) to 
clinical tests 
162
Abtox   (1997) Rader, Mayer, 
Michel 
Tests data on 
Class II device 
used for raising 
capital 
Underlying purpose of test 
is irrelevant if data could 









Irrelevant as long as related 
to FDA submission 
Chartrex  (1993) Rader, Mayer, 
Plager 
Display at trade 
shows and use in 
consumer studies 
Do not lose § 271(e) 
exemption by engaging in 
other activities  
165
TelectronicsPlager,  Michel, Rich 166 
(1992) 
Class II medical 
devices 
§ 271(e) includes medical 
devices, not restricted by 
legislative history 
Eli Lilly (1990) Roche doctrine not limited 
to drugs, § 271(e) 
overruled Roche  





161 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  
162 Id. at 872. 
163 Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron, Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
164 Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co., Inc., 991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
165 Chartrex Int’l PLC v. M.D. Pers. Prods. Corp., 5 F.3d 1505 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
166 Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
167 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aff’d, 496 U.S 661 (1990).  
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